Sex, Statistics, Peacekeepers and Power: UN Data on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and the Quest For Legal Reform by Grady, Kate
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Modern Law Review Vol. 79, (6) published by Wiley: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-2230/issues  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23064/  
© K Grady 2016 
  
1 
 
 
K Grady, ‘Sex, Statistics, Peacekeepers and Power: 
UN Data on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and the Quest For Legal Reform’ 
(2016) 79(6) Modern Law Review 931-960 
 
„[I]f you want to inspire confidence, give plenty of statistics. It does not matter that they 
should be accurate, or even intelligible, so long as there is enough of them.‟ 
Lewis Carroll 
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
 
 
Abstract: The UN Secretariat provides annual statistics on allegations of sexual exploitation 
and abuse made against peacekeeping personnel, with reduced numbers of allegations 
leading to claims of success for the UN’s ‘zero tolerance’ policy. This article explores the use 
of data as ‘technologies’ of global governance, to examine the function that these annual 
statistics serve for the UN and the impact that they have on calls for legal reform. Thus far, 
the statistics have attracted little academic appraisal. Yet, they have been used to establish 
the UN’s authority to resolve the ‘problem’ of sexual exploitation and abuse, diminishing the 
space for critique of UN policy and undermining the quest for improved legal arrangements. 
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Introduction 
 
„Child refugee sex scandal‟ was the headline on the BBC News on 26 February 2002.1 The 
BBC‟s coverage was sparked by the leaking of a report which implicated UN peacekeepers in 
sexual exploitation and abuse of refugees in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
2
 The UN was 
initially dismissive of the report: an investigation by its own Office of Internal Oversight 
Services found that the allegations against peacekeepers were unsubstantiated.
3
 It was, the 
Office said, „misleading and untrue‟ to say that sexual exploitation and abuse was widespread 
since many of allegations against peacekeepers were based on rumour, speculation or myth.
4
  
 
On 15 April 2003, the UN General Assembly considered the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services‟ investigation. In so doing, it requested the Secretary-General „to maintain data on 
investigations into sexual exploitation and related offences, irrespective of age and gender, by 
                                                          
1
 BBC News, Child refugee sex scandal, 26 February 2002, at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1842512.stm 
(last accessed 28 June 2016). 
2
 UNHCR and Save the Children UK, Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (February 2002).  
3
 BBC News, UN rejects refugee sex abuse allegations, 23 October 2002 at 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2351805.stm (last accessed 28 June 2016); UN Office of Internal Oversight 
Services, Report by the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the investigation into sexual exploitation of 
refugees by aid workers in West Africa, UN Doc. A/57/465, 11 October 2002, para 17. 
4
 ibid para 42; para 15(a)-(f).  
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humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel‟.5  Sexual exploitation in this context has been 
defined by the UN to mean „any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, 
differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting 
monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.‟ Sexual abuse 
„means the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or 
under unequal or coercive conditions.‟6  
 
By the time of the General Assembly resolution, the prevailing political winds at the UN had 
changed: on 17 March 2003 the United States declared war on Iraq
7
 following months of 
anxious debate at the UN. The world body, the US administration argued, had become a 
defunct, irrelevant institution. A comment piece appeared in The Guardian newspaper 
entitled „Thank God for the death of the UN‟.8 The issue of sexual exploitation and abuse, 
once a drop in the UN ocean, now appeared on the horizon as a looming scandal. By 2004, it 
had escalated into a full-blown crisis. With the UN also battling allegations of corruption in 
the Oil for Food programme,
9
 more reports alleged that peacekeepers in the mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo „were involved in the sexual abuse and exploitation of local 
                                                          
5
 UN General Assembly Res. 57/306 (2003), para 10. This was the first time that such data had been collected 
centrally: E. Rehn and E. Johnson Sirleaf, Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the 
Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace-building (New York: UNIFEM, 2002), 72. 
6
 UN Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13, 9 October 2003, s.1. 
7
 S. Meisler, Kofi Annan: A Man of Peace in a World of War (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley and Sons, 2007), 
251. 
8
 ibid at 255. 
9
 ibid chapter 15. 
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Congolese girls.‟10 „DR Congo‟s shameful sex secret‟ cried the BBC,11 followed in short 
succession by, „[Kofi] Annan admits UN DR Congo abuses‟12 and, to finish the year, „New 
sex misconduct claims hit UN‟,13 this time in the peacekeeping operation in Burundi. In early 
2005, the Office of Internal Oversight Services accepted that there was a „pattern‟ of 
behaviour in the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo which included regular sexual 
contact between peacekeepers and local women and girls, often in exchange for food or small 
amounts of cash.
14
 These allegations, some have said, were the „turning point‟ for the UN.15  
 
Since the General Assembly made that request for data in 2003 the UN Secretariat has been 
reporting annually statistics about allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse said to have 
been committed by UN peacekeeping personnel. The purpose of this article is to examine the 
manner in which the UN has collated and presented that data. It is argued that the 
presentation and interpretation of these statistics has resulted in reduced impetus to undertake 
legal reforms designed to address sexual exploitation and abuse, and contributes to the 
                                                          
10
 UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into 
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. A/59/661, 5 January 2005, para 1. 
11
 BBC News, DR Congo’s shameful sex secret, 3 June 2004, at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3769469.stm 
(last accessed 28 June 2016). 
12
 BBC News, Annan admits UN DR Congo abuses, 19 November 2004 at 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4027319.stm (last accessed 28 June 2016). 
13
 BBC News, New sex misconduct claims hit UN, 17 December 2004 at 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4106515.stm (last accessed 28 June 2016). 
14
 UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (n 10 above), 1-2. 
15
 A. Shotton, „A Strategy to Address Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel‟ 
(2006) 39 Cornell ILJ 97, 97.  
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stagnation of efforts to secure accountability. Allegations about the sexual misconduct of 
peacekeepers may reach the UN via a variety of different routes. UN peacekeepers 
themselves, whether civilian, police or military, have an obligation to report suspicions of 
sexual exploitation and abuse.
16
 For those outside the UN system, the organisation has 
established mechanisms to notify local communities of the reporting channels available to 
them.  These include the provision of posters for display in public areas,
17
 the establishment 
of websites, telephone and email hotlines,
18
 and most recently a „community-based complaint 
reception mechanism‟.19 A specific person or body is supposed to be appointed in each 
mission with explicit responsibility for dealing with allegations of sexual exploitation and 
abuse. In some peacekeeping operations, the Head of mission „appoint[s] an official, at a 
sufficiently high level, to serve as a focal point for receiving reports on cases‟.20 In other 
missions, there is a conduct and discipline team to which allegations should be reported.
21
 In 
                                                          
16
 UN Secretary-General (n 6 above), s.3.1(e) and UN General Assembly, Annex: Revised draft model 
memorandum of understanding, UN Doc. A/61/19 (Part III), 12 June 2007, Art 7bis and Annex H. 
17
 Posters can be viewed on the Conduct and Discipline Unit website at cdu.unlb.org/AboutCDU.aspx (last 
accessed 28 June 2016). 
18
 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Presentation by Jean-Marie Guéhenno Under-Secretary-
General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 4 April 2005, at 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/articles/article040405.htm (last accessed 28 June 2016); N. Dahrendorf, Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse: Lessons Learned Study (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2006), 
para 6.  
19
 UN Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN Doc. 
A/70/729, 16 February 2016, para 47 (hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2016 Report‟).  
20
 UN Secretary-General (n 6 above), s.4.3. 
21
 See UN Conduct and Discipline Unit, Conduct and Discipline Teams, at 
https://cdu.unlb.org/AboutCDU/ConductandDisciplineTeams.aspx (last accessed 28 June 2016); UN 
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2005, a central Conduct and Discipline Unit was established at UN headquarters in New 
York to provide „overall direction for conduct and discipline issues in peacekeeping 
operations and special political missions, including incidents of sexual exploitation and 
abuse.‟22 Despite the aim of centralising receipt of allegations, in practice, incidents of sexual 
exploitation and abuse are reported not only to the focal point and conduct and discipline 
teams, but also directly to military contingents, to the Field Staff Unit, to the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services, to the United Nations Staff Association, to the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General and to staff supervisors.
23
   
 
Legal responsibility for addressing the allegations that reach the UN differs depending on the 
identity of the alleged perpetrator. Civilian police and military observers amount to „experts 
on mission‟ whilst UN staff and volunteers are generally deemed to be UN „officials‟.24 
Under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946 both 
experts on mission and UN officials have functional immunity from national legal processes 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Standard Operating Procedure: Public Information Activities on 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, 3 April 2006, Annex C, para. 3.1. 
22
 UN Conduct and Discipline Unit, at https://cdu.unlb.org/ (last accessed 28 June 2016). 
23
 T. Awori, C. Lutz and P.J. Thapa, Final Report: Expert Mission to Evaluate Risks to SEA Prevention Efforts 
in MINUSTAH, UNMIL, MONUSCO, and UNMISS, 3 November 2013, at 
http://www.aidsfreeworld.org/Newsroom/Press-
Releases/2015/~/media/Files/Peacekeeping/2013%20Expert%20Team%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (last accessed 
28 June 2016), 11 and 14. 
24
 A.J. Miller, „United Nations Experts on Mission and their Privileges and Immunities‟ (2007) IOLR 11, 31; 
A.J. Miller, „Legal Aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations‟ (2006) 
39 Cornell ILJ 71, 75, 77 and 79. 
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in respect of their official conduct.
25
 But, since sexual exploitation and abuse are unlikely to 
amount to official conduct, experts on mission and UN officials could be subject to 
prosecution in the courts of the host State or their State of nationality
26
 (provided, of course, 
that the allegation amounts to a crime in the law of that State). Such individuals could also be 
subject to disciplinary proceedings by the UN since compliance with the Secretary-General‟s 
Bulletin on sexual exploitation and abuse is included in their contractual arrangements.
27
 For 
UN military contingents, the troop-contributor has „primary responsibility‟ for investigating 
misconduct and holds exclusive prosecutorial jurisdiction.
28
 Such individuals are therefore 
subject to the military justice system of their sending State. In providing forces, troop 
contributors agree to „ensure that all members of the … national contingent are required to 
comply with the United Nations standards of conduct‟, including the prohibition on sexual 
exploitation and abuse.
29
 The troop-contributor also „assures the United Nations that it shall 
exercise‟ criminal and/or disciplinary jurisdiction with respect to any crimes, offences or 
other misconduct,
30
 although whether troop-contributors abide by this assurance remains a 
moot point.
31
 
                                                          
25
 This immunity is, however, subject to waiver by the Secretary-General: Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations 1946, sections 18(a), 20, 22(b) and 23; A.J. Miller, „Legal Aspects of 
Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations‟ (2006) 39 Cornell ILJ 71, 91-92.  
26
 Miller, ibid at 92. 
27
 Miller, ibid at 76 and 79; B. Oswald, H. Durham and A. Bates, Documents on the Law of UN Peace 
Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 432. 
28
 UN General Assembly (n 16 above), Art 7 quarter; 7 quinquiens. 
29
 ibid Art 7 bis. 
30
 ibid Art 7 quinquiens. See also Art 7 sexiens. 
31
 For the position in respect of international peacekeepers not under UN command, see M. Deschamps, H.B. 
Jallow and Y. Sooka, Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Report of an 
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Whatever the legal status of the perpetrator, statistics on allegations are required to be 
reported annually the General Assembly, and are presented as the measure of the success of 
the UN‟s policy of „zero tolerance‟. The purpose of this article is first to examine that data on 
its own merits, offering comment upon the quality of its collection and dissemination, and 
second to consider the implications it holds for the UN‟s ability to undertake legal reform to 
address sexual exploitation and abuse. The lens through which these issues are examined is 
the literature developed by Davis et al, amongst others, on indicators as a technology of 
global governance. These authors have argued that the use of indicators „has the potential to 
alter the forms, the exercise, and perhaps even the distributions of power in certain spheres of 
global governance.‟ 32  This analysis yields valuable insights into the legal and political 
significance of the UN statistics examined here.
33
 We explore the manner in which the UN‟s 
statistics label the concept of sexual exploitation and abuse, to the exclusion of other forms of 
misconduct, and simplify it, losing ambiguity and nuance along the way. The consequence of 
the UN‟s presentation of the data is to diminish the space available for evaluation and critique 
of UN policy and implicitly assign the power to „solve‟ the „problem‟ to UN „experts‟. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central 
African Republic, 17 December 2015, at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/centafricrepub/Independent-
Review-Report.pdf, 22.  
32
 K.E. Davis, A. Fisher, B. Kingsbury and S.E. Merry, „Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators‟ in K.E. 
Davis, A. Fisher, B. Kingsbury and S.E. Merry, Governance by Indictors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 4. 
33
 The data does not necessarily meet the strict definition of an indicator established by Davis et al, but the 
analysis nevertheless applies: ibid at 6. 
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also shifts attention away from the structural legal challenges relevant to sexual exploitation 
and abuse and accountability for it.  
 
The annual reports to the General Assembly 
 
The UN Secretary-General‟s annual reports to the General Assembly have few consistent 
features. From a mere five pages of prose in 2004,
34
 to 41 pages including five annexes of 
tables and six graphs in 2016,
35
 these reports have grown longer and more elaborate with 
each successive year. If the total number of allegations reported annually to the General 
Assembly is shown in a graph, it looks like the one below.
36
 As will be apparent, later years 
show a general decrease in allegations from a peak of over 350 in 2007.  
                                                          
34
 UN Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN Doc. 
A/58/777, 23 April 2004 (hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2004 Report‟). 
35
 Secretary-General‟s 2016 Report (n 19 above). 
36
 Data is recorded here for the year the report was issued although it reflects allegations received within the 
previous calendar year. On commensuration see W.N. Espeland and M.L. Stevens, „A Sociology of 
Quantification‟ (2008) 49(3) EJ of Sociology 401, 408; W.N. Espeland and M. Sauder, „The Dynamism of 
Indicators‟, in Davis et al (n 32 above), 91-95. 
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Yet the manner in which this data has been collated, presented and explained raises a number 
of questions as to the reliability of these statistics. The first report, in 2004, provides statistics 
on what are described as „cases‟, although there is no explanation as to what a „case‟ might 
be.
37
 In 2005 and 2006, the reports use the phrases „allegations‟ and „cases‟, again without 
explanation as to what might count as an „allegation‟ or a „case‟.38 In 2007, we are offered, 
for the first time, an insight into what might underpin these terms. A footnote in the report 
explains: „it should be noted that these numbers do not reflect the number of alleged 
perpetrators nor victims, as multiple allegations could correspond to one alleged 
perpetrator‟39and „conversely, a single allegation may be made in respect of more than one 
                                                          
37
 Secretary-General‟s 2004 Report (n 34 above), paras 2 and 3. 
38
 UN Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN Doc. 
A/59/782, 15 April 2005 (hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2005 Report‟); UN Secretary-General, Special 
measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN Doc. A/60/861, 24 May 2006, 
(hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2006 Report‟). 
39
 UN Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN Doc. 
A/61/957, 15 June 2007, footnote 1 (hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2007 Report‟). 
0
50
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Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against 
peacekeeping personnel reported annually to the General 
Assembly 
(source: Secretary-General's annual reports 2004-2016) 
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individual.‟40 In subsequent years, some reports explain that allegations many involve more 
than one perpetrator, but make no mention of whether the number of allegations reflects the 
exact number of victims.
41
 In other years, the reports explain that „each allegation may 
involve more than one possible victim‟, but do not say whether any allegations cover more 
than one perpetrator.
42
 Reports since 2013 have attempted to identify the number of 
individual involved, but sometimes, the UN says the number of victims is unknown.
43
 
 
It seems therefore that the number of allegations is a reflection of neither the number of 
victims nor the number of perpetrators. Instead, the UN is measuring the number of 
communications it receives about incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse. The obvious 
(although unmentioned) risk is that, since one allegation may represent more than one victim 
and/or more than one perpetrator, the data under-reports the scale of the phenomenon. For 
example, in 2015 the Secretary-General explained that „one … allegation reportedly involved 
                                                          
40
 ibid para 14. See also UN Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and 
sexual abuse, UN Doc. A/63/720, 17 February 2009, para 8 (hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2009 Report‟). 
41
 For example, UN Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual 
abuse, UN Doc. A/64/669, 18 February 2010, para 8 (hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2010 Report‟); UN 
Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN Doc. 
A/66/699, 17 February 2012, footnote 9 (hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2012 Report‟). 
42
 For example, UN Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual 
abuse, UN Doc. A/67/766, 28 February 2013, para 18 (hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2013 Report‟); UN 
Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN Doc. 
A/69/779, 13 February 2015 (hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2015 Report‟), para 9. 
43
 See Secretary-General‟s 2015 Report (n 42 above), para 9; UN Secretary-General, Special measures for 
protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN Doc. A/68/756, 14 February 2014, para 21 
(hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2014 Report‟). 
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two adults and one minor.‟44 Therefore, what counts as „one‟ allegation for the purposes of 
the report to the General Assembly in fact denotes two alleged peacekeeper perpetrators. As 
we shall see, under-reporting of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse – that is to say, 
incidents that are never reported to the UN – is an on-going concern.45 Here, there is a 
different form of under-reporting: allegations are made known to the UN, but the method the 
UN uses to count those communications means that incidents involving multiple victims or 
multiple perpetrators are masked since they are treated as only one allegation. By contrast, it 
is presumably possible that some incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse are reported to 
UN bodies more than once. The UN does not say whether it is able to identify 
communications which may refer to the same incident, nor whether the data is adjusted to 
address potential double-counting.  
 
If the scale of what is being reported is unclear, so also is it unclear whether this constitutes a 
complete picture. The 2009 report explains that, „for the first time, all entities that had been 
requested to provide information on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse provided a 
response‟ suggesting that in previous years reporting was less than complete.46  Yet, the 
reports of 2005, 2006 and 2007 also claimed that information had been provided to the 
Secretariat by all the entities asked.
47
 In 2008, with no hint of irony, the Secretary-General 
indicated that he had not received data prior to the preparation of the report from four UN 
                                                          
44
 Secretary-General‟s 2015 Report (n 42 above), para 9. 
45
 See below at XX. 
46
 Secretary-General‟s 2009 Report (n 40 above), para 27 and para 3. 
47
 Secretary-General‟s 2005 Report (n 38 above), para 3; Secretary-General‟s 2006 Report (n 38 above), para 3; 
Secretary-General‟s 2007 Report (n 39 above), para 3. 
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entities, of which one was his own Office of the Secretary-General.
48
 A certain measure of 
the unevenness here may be attributed to changing conceptions of what constitutes an „entity‟ 
for such purposes. This is best illustrated by the 2009 report which includes some of the 
Department of Political Affairs data in that for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
along with figures for UN Volunteers.
49
 Two years later and the Department of Political 
Affairs is counted separately, although „data related to special political missions supported by 
the Department of Field Support‟ are now included in the figures for peacekeeping 
personnel.
50
 Evidently, changing the conception of an „entity‟ from one year to the next 
makes comparing levels of allegations for each entity year-on-year difficult, if not impossible. 
 
Beyond questions of scale and comprehensiveness, there are almost annual changes in the 
categories of sexual exploitation and abuse that are reported upon: taxonomies developed in 
one year are jettisoned the next – with virtually no explanation for the changes. In 2004, a 
global figure of cases was provided under a generic title without attempt to differentiate 
between discrete categories or forms.
51
 In 2005 and 2006, allegations were labelled with six 
different classifications: „sex with minors‟, „employment for sex‟, „sex with prostitutes‟, 
„sexual assault‟, „rape‟ and „other‟. The data was also organized by the type of personnel 
                                                          
48
 UN Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN Doc. 
A/62/890, 25 June 2008, Annex1 (hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2008 Report‟). 
49
 Secretary-General‟s 2009 Report (n 40 above), footnotes 2 and 4. The same is true in 2010: Secretary-
General‟s 2010 Report (n 41 above), footnotes 1 and 2. 
50
 UN Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN Doc. 
A/65/742, 18 February 2011, footnote 1 (hereinafter „Secretary-General‟s 2011 Report‟). See also Secretary-
General‟s 2012 Report (n 41 above), footnote 1; Secretary-General‟s 2013 Report (n 42 above), footnote 1. 
51
 Secretary-General‟s 2004 Report (n 34 above), para 3. 
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against whom the allegation was made (such as military personnel).
52
 In 2007 and 2008, the 
same labels were used, except that „employment for sex‟ was jettisoned in favour of 
„exploitative sexual relationships‟.53  It is not clear that the two are synonymous and no 
explanation was given for the change. The next year, the report classified the nature of the 
allegations into eight new categories: „rape (victim under age 18 (minor))‟, „rape (victim 18 
years of age or over)‟, „sexually exploitative pornography‟, „transactional sex (including for 
food, work, money)‟, „exploitative relationship‟, „sexual abuse (non-consensual physical or 
emotional contact) (victim under age 18(minor))‟, „sexual abuse (non-consensual physical or 
emotional contact) (victim 18 years of age or over)‟ and „other‟.54 By 2011, the format of the 
statistics had again changed. Allegations were no longer labelled according to the nature of 
the allegation but only in relation to different types of peacekeeping personnel accused 
(military, police, etc) and their mission.
55
 Two years on and the allegations were, for the first 
time, presented one-by-one in a list rather than as total figures in tabular form with the 
consequence that lines must be counted by the reader manually in order to discover the total 
numbers. For each allegation appeared the relevant mission, the category of personnel against 
                                                          
52
 Secretary-General‟s 2005 Report (n 38 above), Annex I; Secretary-General‟s 2006 Report (n 38 above), 
Annex I. 
53
 Secretary-General‟s 2007 Report (n 39 above), Annex VI; Secretary-General‟s 2008 Report (n 48 above), 
Annex VI. 
54
 Secretary-General‟s 2009 Report (n 40 above), Annex V. See also Secretary-General‟s 2010 Report (n 41 
above), Annex V. 
55
 Secretary-General‟s 2011 Report (n 50 above), Annex V. For personnel at UN entities other than those related 
to peacekeeping, allegations were still classified by their nature: see Annex II. Subsequently, a „supplementary‟ 
list including updated information for allegations reported between 2010 and 2013 was released, at 
https://cdu.unlb.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=fPIveoD9SBk%3d&tabid=93&mid=480 (last accessed 28 June 
2016). 
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whom the allegation was made, whether the victim was an adult or minor (and in some cases, 
numbers of victims) and the nature of the allegation.
56
 This time, as in the 2014 report,
57
 the 
allegations were divided into 3 categories: „abuse‟, „exploitation‟ and „exploitation 
(paternity)‟. The 2015 report maintained the format of a list but divided the allegations into 
four categories: „abuse‟, „exploitation‟, „exploitation (paternity)‟ and „abuse (paternity)‟, the 
final category being a new addition.
58
 It is unclear whether this new category reflected 
another way of organising the different types of allegations or whether its absence from the 
year before was merely an indicator that there were no allegations of this type. Elsewhere in 
the 2015 report, statistics were separated by seven different labels: „sex with a minor‟, „sexual 
assault – victim under 18‟, „sexual assault – victim over 18‟, „trafficking in persons for sexual 
exploitation‟, „exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex (adults only)‟, 
„other forms of sexual exploitation and abuse‟ and „other violations of the provisions of [the 
Secretary-General‟s Bulletin] … (e.g. false reporting of sexual exploitation and abuse)‟.59 
How these statistics related to the earlier list in the 2015 report was left unexplained. In 2016, 
for the first time, the report included three different lists disaggregated by civilian, police and 
military personnel. The information in each list was also more elaborate than in earlier years. 
Each list identified the mission in which the allegation was made; the „[c]ategory of 
personnel and number of subjects‟; the number of victims and whether they are an adult or a 
minor; a description of the allegation; the investigation status, duration, outcome and findings; 
whether paternity was established; what interim action and final action was taken; and 
                                                          
56
 Secretary-General‟s 2013 Report (n 42 above), Annex IV. 
57
 Secretary-General‟s 2014 Report (n 43 above), Annex III. 
58
 Secretary-General‟s 2015 Report (n 42 above), Annex III. 
59
 Secretary-General‟s 2015 Report (n 42 above), Annex IV.  
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whether there was referral for criminal prosecution.
60
 For military and police personnel, the 
nationality of the suspects was also disclosed, and the question of referral for prosecution 
replaced by a category entitled „[d]etails of action by‟ the troop or police contributor.61 As 
with the 2015 report, the allegations were organised into separate classifications, but again 
these were different from those used the year before. For 2016, the categories provided were: 
„exploitative relationship‟, „exploitative relationship (paternity)‟, „transactional sex‟, 
„transactional sex (paternity)‟, „sexual activity with minor‟, „sexual activity with minor 
(paternity)‟, „sexual assault‟, and „sexual assault (paternity)‟.62  
 
In reports for some years, the classification of the nature of allegations appears to have been 
done only for allegations into which the investigation has been completed
63
 and the numbers 
listed for these years in relation to the nature of allegations therefore bear no relationship to 
the number of allegations that year, because allegations for which investigations are still 
pending are not counted and classified. In other years, that position seems to be reversed.
64
 
The term „investigation‟ also does not give any indication of the likely scale of sexual 
exploitation and abuse. In some years, the reports said that „one investigation could 
involve … multiple alleged perpetrators‟65 whilst in other years, the term „is used to refer to 
                                                          
60
 Secretary-General‟s 2016 Report (n 19 above), Annexes III, IV and V. 
61
 Secretary-General‟s 2016 Report (n 19 above), Annexes IV and V. 
62
 Secretary-General‟s 2016 Report (n 19 above), Annexes III, IV and V. 
63
 See, for example, Secretary-General‟s 2007 Report (n 39 above), Annex VI and para 10; Secretary-General‟s 
2008 Report (n 48 above), Annex VI; Secretary-General‟s 2009 Report (n 40 above), Annex V. 
64
 See, for example, Secretary-General‟s 2013 Report (n 42 above), Annex IV and Secretary-General‟s 2014 
Report (n 43 above), Annex III. 
65
 Secretary-General‟s 2007 Report (n 39 above), footnote 1. 
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the number of individuals identified in investigation reports‟66 ie each perpetrator counts as 
one investigation. After 2010, no explanation for what counts as an „investigation‟ is 
provided, although one reading of the data for 2014 would be that each allegation now merits 
one investigation since the data on numbers of allegations and outcomes of investigations 
matches.
67
 Many reports also provide data on outcomes of investigations, for example, 
documenting the number which found the allegation to be substantiated. The difficulty is that, 
for the period 2005 to 2010 at least, there is no relationship between the numbers of 
allegations and the outcomes of investigations. It is therefore not possible to understand, for 
example, how many allegations are deemed substantiated after they have been investigated 
and therefore to establish the extent to which perpetrators could be held legally accountable. 
 
Whilst a charitable reading of the year-by-year changes to the UN‟s reporting of this data 
may ascribe it to a desire to „improve‟ that reporting, such changes obviously undermine the 
possibility of comparison between one year and the next. Understanding the statistics is 
further hampered as a consequence of the generic labelling that is employed. It is perhaps to 
be assumed that classifications involving the words „exploitation‟, „abuse‟ and „minors‟, are 
defined according to the Secretary-General‟s Bulletin, although in some instances it is 
unclear whether these descriptors fall within the terms of the Bulletin. For example, how does 
the category „sexual abuse (non-consensual physical or emotional contact)‟ relate to the 
definition of sexual abuse from the Bulletin as „the actual or threatened physical intrusion of 
a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions‟? 68 Furthermore, 
                                                          
66
 Secretary-General‟s 2008 Report (n 48 above), footnote 1; Secretary-General‟s 2010 Report (n 41 above), 
para. 8. 
67
 Secretary-General‟s 2014 Report (n 43 above), Annex II. 
68
 UN Secretary-General (n 6 above), s.1 (emphasis added). 
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we have no explanation in many reports of the meanings the UN gives to phrases such as: 
„employment for sex‟; „sex with prostitutes‟; „sexually exploitative pornography‟; „trafficking 
in persons for sexual exploitation‟, „exploitative relationship‟, „exchange of money, 
employment, goods or services for sex‟ and the even more generic „other‟. Whilst the 
terminology of „sexual exploitation‟ and „sexual abuse‟ from the Secretary-General‟s Bulletin 
appears in other international conventions,
69
 which may assist us in determining their 
meaning, most of the descriptions adopted in the UN‟s annual statistics do not seem to derive 
from other international sources. This leaves in question the meanings of many of the 
categories employed, and does not tell us whether the categories overlap or are deemed 
mutually exclusive.  
 
From time to time the UN has sought to define some of the labels employed within the 
reports, but these have often posed more questions than they have answered. For example, the 
2007 report defined „sexual assault‟ as „any non-consensual act which is forced by one or 
more persons upon another.‟70 There is no further explanation of how the UN determines 
what amounts to „consent‟ and what is meant by „forced‟. By contrast, „rape‟ in this report 
was defined as „sexual intercourse which is achieved without the person‟s consent.‟71 There is 
                                                          
69
 The phrases „sexual exploitation‟ and „sexual abuse‟ appear in the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, 
Art 34 although the definitions from the Secretary-General‟s Bulletin do not. Some – but by no means all – 
aspects of those definitions seem reminiscent of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime 2000, Art 3. 
70
 Secretary-General‟s 2007 Report (n 39 above), Annex VI. 
71
 ibid. It is unclear whether the definition is gender-neutral and includes anal penetration. A case of „sodomy‟ 
was identified by the Office of Internal Oversight Services in 2002: (n 3 above), 3. 
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no mention here of the need for force. The UN definitions therefore appear to differentiate 
between rape and sexual assault on the basis of the existence of sexual intercourse and force 
– the former being required for rape and the latter being required for sexual assault. Thus, it is 
not clear what happens if the sexual intercourse is unforced, for example, because the victim 
lacked the capacity to consent for reasons such as unconsciousness or intoxication.
72
 This 
would appear to fit the definition of sexual assault but is it still rape by the UN‟s definition? 
By 2015, the distinction between these two forms of behaviour had been collapsed and the 
requirement for force abandoned: „sexual assault‟ for this year was defined as „[n]on-
consensual sexual activities, including rape.‟73 Similarly, the category entitled „exploitative 
sexual relationships‟ in the 2007 report was defined as referring to „exchanges of sexual 
favours for money, food, employment or other goods or services, excluding engaging in 
prostitution.‟74 Since one would imagine that the exchange of sexual services in return for 
money is a paradigm example of prostitution, the basis for this distinction is peculiar. By 
2015, a volte face has occurred: „exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex‟ 
now explicitly „[i]ncludes solicitation of a prostitute.‟75 Statistics from the 2008 report on 
„sex with prostitutes‟ adds to the confusion. The Secretariat noted that these statistics include 
„investigations of commanders for failure of command, as well as investigations of 
prostitution with minors.‟76 Presumably, this means that allegations that UN commanders 
have failed to adequately prevent or punish cases of sex with prostitutes are included in the 
                                                          
72
 In this report, those who lack the age-related capacity to consent are dealt with under the heading „sex with 
minors‟: Secretary-General‟s 2007 Report (n 39 above), Annex VI. 
73
 Secretary-General‟s 2015 Report (n 42 above), Annex IV. 
74
 Secretary-General‟s 2007 Report (n 39 above), Annex VI. 
75
 Secretary-General‟s 2015 Report (n 42 above), Annex IV. 
76
 Secretary-General‟s 2008 Report (n 48 above), Annex VI. 
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data. Yet, this is the only time in any of the reports when cases of command responsibility are 
mentioned. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the category entitled „other‟ is the most opaque of all, and 
often goes unexplained. In some reports a partial explanation is provided. For example, in the 
2006 report: „other‟ included „allegations of distribution of pornography over e-mail‟, 
„inappropriate relationships with the local population‟, „allegations of food in exchange for 
sex‟ and „paternity claims.‟77 However, the figures given for these allegations do not add up 
to the total number classified as „other‟, so presumably there were other „other‟ allegations 
for which no explanation is provided.  
 
The UN’s interpretation of the data  
 
If the unevenness in the data may be attributed to an on-going effort to „improve‟ reporting to 
the General Assembly, one might be more critical of the inferences drawn from it by the UN 
Secretariat. In 2009 the Secretary General was pleased to report that the decrease in the 
numbers of reported allegations since 2007 was proof that the UN‟s „zero tolerance‟ policy 
towards sexual exploitation and abuse was working.
78
 The Secretary-General proclaimed the 
success of the policy, stating that „[t]he decreased number of allegations related to 
peacekeeping personnel can be attributed partly to preventative measures‟,79 although it was 
further noted that „[t]he change in the methods of counting allegations/reports of misconduct 
                                                          
77
 Secretary-General‟s 2006 Report (n 38 above), para 11; see also Secretary-General‟s 2007 Report (n 39 
above), Annex VI. 
78
 See also Secretary-General‟s 2010 Report (n 41 above), para 15; Secretary-General‟s 2012 Report (n 41 
above), para 38. 
79
 Secretary-General‟s 2009 Report (n 40 above), paras 14.  
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over the past years may have also contributed to the decrease in the number of allegations 
being reported‟.80 By 2011, the Secretariat announced that 
[g]iven the methodological difficulties of evaluating the weight of every single factor 
separately, the Secretariat considers it reasonable to conclude that the combination of 
enhanced training and the various preventive measures, … together with 
accountability mechanisms, resulted in the overall continued decrease in reported 
allegations.
81
  
In consequence, „the structures, preventative measures and awareness-raising and training 
activities that have been put in place have contributed to the positive results achieved so 
far.‟82 This view was echoed – word-for-word – the following year. 83 By 2013, the UN was 
sufficiently confident to state that the „[c]collaborative efforts between Member States and 
the Organization, in terms of preventative measures, awareness-raising and training, must 
account for such positive results.‟84 
 
As we shall see, the limitations of the data (including the poor quality of the UN‟s data 
management, potential false allegations and under-reporting) call into question the reliability 
of these statistics. In any event, it is surely obvious that merely because numbers of reported 
allegations have decreased, it does not per se follow that this is due to the success of the UN 
response. Correlation is not causation. A number of sources, including the UN‟s own Office 
of Internal Oversight Services, have suggested an equally plausible explanation for this 
                                                          
80
 Secretary-General‟s 2009 Report (n 40 above), para 14. 
81
 Secretary-General‟s 2011 Report (n 50 above), para 23. 
82
 ibid para 34. 
83
 Secretary-General‟s 2012 Report (n 41 above), para 34. 
84
 Secretary-General‟s 2013 Report (n 42 above), para 47 (emphasis added). 
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decrease: rather than eradicating sexual exploitation and abuse, the „zero-tolerance‟ policy 
may have driven it underground.
85
  
 
To make matters worse, even increased allegations are taken by the UN as evidence of 
success. When the total reported allegations doubled between its reports of 2004 and 2005, 
the UN argued that this „deeply troubling‟ increase „may result in part from the newly 
implemented measures to prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse…. In these 
new work environments, it is to be expected that victims, United Nations personnel and 
others will be more inclined to come forward with their allegations.‟86 The following year, 
increased numbers of allegations „may result in part from the newly implemented measures to 
prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse‟,87 and the further increase the year 
after „may reflect, in part, greater awareness and use of reporting mechanisms‟ even though 
the same report later cautioned that „few local communities are aware of the standards of 
                                                          
85
 Office of Internal Oversight Services, Evaluation Report: Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial 
Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the United Nations and Related Personnel in 
Peacekeeping Operations, 15 May 2015 (reissued 12 June 2015), at https://oios.un.org/page/download2/id/13 
(last accessed 28 June 2016), 23; O. Simić, Regulation of Sexual Conduct in UN Peacekeeping Operations 
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2012) 161; 170; P. Higate, Gender and Peacekeeping Case Studies: The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone, ISS Monograph Series no 91 (South Africa: Institute for Security 
Studies, March 2004) 40; S. Martin, Must Boys Be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN 
Peacekeeping Missions (Washington, DC: Refugees International, 2005) 13 and Dahrendorf (n 18 above), para 
32. But cf K. Neudorfer, 'Reducing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Does Deterrence Work to Prevent SEAs in 
UN Peacekeeping Missions?' (2014) 21(5) International Peacekeeping 623. 
86
 Secretary-General‟s 2005 Report (n 38 above), para 9. 
87
 ibid. See also Secretary-General‟s 2006 Report (n 38 above), paras 9 and 21; Secretary-General‟s 2008 Report 
(n 48 above), para 29; Secretary-General‟s 2014 Report (n 43 above), para 25. 
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conduct … and how to come forward when violations occur‟, and some „in-country 
[reporting] networks … have not been established … or are not functioning properly.‟88 
When allegations of certain forms of sexual exploitation and abuse increased in the 2007 
report, this too was „partly attributed to better reporting mechanisms‟.89 The 2008 and 2010 
reports echoed the same view.
90
 In this latter year, the UN also argued that „despite the 
increase in allegations… the strong preventive measures put in place in the various 
peacekeeping operations and special political missions… have contained the occurrence of 
such incidents‟.91 So, first, the increase in allegations is in part a consequence of better UN 
reporting and other mechanisms, and second, but for the UN policy the level of allegations 
would be even higher. Leaving aside the apparent contradiction in the argument, it is difficult 
to find any evidence in the report to support this view. The use of this „UN speak‟ in the 
annual reports seems emblematic of the fact that, as the 2015 Deschamps Review into sexual 
exploitation and abuse by international peacekeeping forces in the Central African Republic 
identified, „the UN is more concerned with rhetoric than action.‟ 92  It also gives the 
impression that the zero tolerance policy will be deemed a success regardless of what 
happens to the numbers of allegations. Heads I win, tails you lose.  
 
                                                          
88
 Secretary-General‟s 2006 Report (n 38 above), para 9 and paras 19-20. 
89
 Secretary-General‟s 2007 Report (n 39 above), para 13. 
90
 Secretary-General‟s 2008 Report (n 48 above), para 29; Secretary-General‟s 2010 Report (n 41 above), para 
31 and  also para 14 and Secretary-General‟s 2014 Report (n 43 above), para 25 and Secretary-General‟s 2015 
Report (n 42 above), para 21. 
91
 Secretary-General‟s 2010 Report (n 41 above), para 15. Cf Secretary-General‟s 2011 Report (n 50 above), 
para 23. 
92
 Deschamps et al (n 31 above), at xiii. 
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Statistics as technologies of global governance 
 
Despite the UN‟s claims, there are significant limitations to the usefulness of its statistics 
because of problems with data collection, false allegations and under-reporting. Furthermore, 
there are wider implications flowing from the UN‟s approach, and the inferences it draws 
from the data. These implications are particularly acute in respect of the space available for 
critique of UN policy. This also impacts on the political will to achieve legal reform which 
could address the worst cases of sexual exploitation and abuse. These matters are vividly 
illustrated by considering this data through the lens of the recent body of scholarship 
examining the role that statistics, particularly indicators, play in global governance.
93
 As 
Davis et al explain, „[g]overnance comprises the means used to influence behaviour, the 
production of resources and the distribution of resources.‟94 The study of global governance 
therefore entails, amongst other matters, the study of how and for what ends power is 
structured between international actors.
95
 In this context, the work of Davis et al allows us to 
examine the authority wielded by the UN Secretariat, and the significance this has for the 
                                                          
93
 See generally Davis et al (n 32 above); S.E. Merry, K.E. Davis and B. Kingsbury, The Quiet Power of 
Indicators: Measuring Governance, Corruption, and Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2015); S.E. Merry, „Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance‟ (2011) 52(3) 
Current Anthropology S83; M. Satterthwaite, „Measuring Human Rights: Indicators, Expertise, and Evidence-
Based Practice‟ (2012) 106 ASIL Proceedings 253; T. Landman, „Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice, 
and Policy‟ (2004) HRQ 906. 
94
 Davis et al (n 32 above), 10. See also M. Jerven, Poor Numbers: How We are Misled by African Development 
Statistics and What to Do about It (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013) 4-5 and N. Krisch and B. Kingsbury, 
„Introduction: global governance and global administrative law in the international legal order‟ (2006) EJIL 1. 
95
 Davis et al (n 32 above), 10-11. 
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willingness of the member states to amend existing legal structures dealing with sexual 
exploitation and abuse.  
 
The different mechanisms used in respect of this global governance are „technologies‟,96 of 
which indicators are one. Indeed, indicators have become an increasingly common 
mechanism for those seeking to achieve political and legal change. As Krever identifies, 
international organisations have developed a „quantitative fetishism‟ „[s]ince the 1990s [with] 
the expansion of econometric and quantitative modelling techniques, with an attendant almost 
automatic quantitative orientation to all social questions‟.97 The Women, Peace and Security 
framework which has been translated into indicators designed to measure progress in 
implementing Security Council Resolution 1325
98
 is but one example; others abound in fields 
as diverse as human rights; the rule of law; sex-trafficking; water, sanitation and hygiene; to 
name but a few.
99
   
                                                          
96
 P. Miller and N. Rose, Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2008); K.E. Davis, B. Kingsbury and S.E. Merry, „Introduction: The Local-Global Life of 
Indicators: Law, Power, and Resistance‟ in Merry et al (n 94 above), 1. 
97
 T. Krever, „Quantifying Law: legal indicator projects and the reproduction of neoliberal common sense‟ (2013) 
34(1) TWQ 131, 134-135. 
98
 See Security Council Res. 1889 (2009), para 17 and UN Secretary-General, Report on Women and Peace and 
Security, UN Doc. S/2010/498 (2010), 27 et seq. 
99
 eg Merry (n 94 above); Satterthwaite (n 94 above); Landman (n 94 above); I.T. Winkler, M.L. Satterthwaite 
and C. De Albuquerque, „Treasuring what we Measure and Measuring what we Treasure: Post-2015 Monitoring 
for the Promotion of Equality in the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Sector‟ (2014) 32 Wisconsin ILJ 547; 
J .Parsons, B. Kutateladze, M. Thornton, A. Bang and A. Yaya, „Justice indicators for post-conflict settings: a 
review‟ [2010] Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 203; A. Ahmed, „Trafficked? AIDS, Criminal Law and the 
Politics of Measurement‟ (2015) 70(1) University of Miami Law Review 96. 
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The statistics reported by the UN on sexual exploitation and abuse share many common 
features with the indicators examined by Davis et al. Some of those features, including the 
absorption of uncertainty from the data and UN headquarters‟ attempts to govern remotely, 
call into question the reliability of the data and inferences drawn therefrom, as we shall see. 
Furthermore, the simplification of the phenomenon of sexual exploitation and abuse, the 
effect of labelling it, the privileging of expert knowledge on how to solve this „problem‟ and 
the diminished space for critique of UN policy all weaken opportunities for meaningful legal 
reform. 
 
Dealing with the first of these aspects – the reliability of the data and inferences drawn 
therefrom – the UN‟s interpretation of the data seems likely to be the product of „uncertainty 
absorption‟.100 By its nature, the collection of data tends to be binary: individual units either 
count or do not; fit within a classification or do not. Uncertainty cannot be tolerated: there is 
no category of „maybe‟ or „almost‟. It is argued that because of this, data collected in the field 
by local actors is stripped of its gaps, ambiguities and nuances as it filters up through the 
hierarchy of the organisation collecting it. Its uncertainty is absorbed.
101
 Inferences are then 
drawn and decisions made, in this case in the UN Secretariat, at the General Assembly, and 
other UN bodies, on the basis of what purports to be clear and accurate evidence, but which 
has in fact lost its subtlety, and lost touch with its grass-roots origins. This leads to over-
confidence in the inferences drawn, as will be apparent in relation to the UN‟s claims about 
the success of its policy. This is also particularly evident in the limited attention that the UN 
                                                          
100
 J March and H Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958), 165. 
101
 ibid; Espeland and Stevens (n 36 above), 421-422; Davis et al (n 32 above), 9. 
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pays to problems in relation to the age of the victim, to the issues of under-reporting and false 
allegations, and to the risk that rather than reducing sexual exploitation and abuse, the UN‟s 
prohibitions have merely driven it underground.
102
  
 
Dealing with the first of these, as we have seen, UN reports often categorise allegations 
against peacekeepers on the basis of whether the victim was under 18 years old.  This reflects 
the terms of the Secretary-General‟s 2003 Bulletin which explains that: „[s]exual activity with 
children (persons under the age of 18) is prohibited regardless of the age of majority or age of 
consent locally. Mistaken belief in the age of a child is not a defence‟. 103  However, 
determining the age of those involved in sexual activities with peacekeepers, particularly in 
post-conflict environments, is likely to be far from simple for investigators. In these locations, 
birth certificates may be lost (particularly if, during the conflict, victims were uprooted from 
their homes) and may subsequently be irreplaceable or, even if replaced, unverifiable 
(particularly in states without a central register of births). Similarly, in many states, birth 
certificates are falsifiable. Alternatively, medical evidence to determine the age of the victim 
may not be easily obtained and in any event, given scientific limitations in this area, is 
unlikely to be conclusive.
104
 Yet, reading the reports, there is no mention of this doubt about 
the age of the victims.  
                                                          
102
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103
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Similar uncertainty emerges in respect of levels of allegations. Simply put, „[e]vents-based 
data are prone to either underreporting of events that did occur or over-reporting of events 
that did not occur‟.105 In respect of the latter, there is evidence that some allegations are likely 
to have been fabricated. The UN has itself identified cases of false allegations made by fellow 
peacekeeping personnel, victims and local police. One report into the mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo argued, controversially, that „[m]ore than one-third of the 
unsubstantiated allegations against civilian personnel were false allegations.‟106 Most recently, 
the Secretary-General has said only that false allegations „sometimes‟ occur.107 It is important 
not to overstate the significance of this. There are a variety of likely causes of these false 
allegations, including simple errors (mistaken identity, for example) and ulterior motives. The 
latter category includes allegations driven by political displeasure at the peacekeeping 
mission or in the hope of financial gain by way of compensation.
108
 In this vein, one 
investigation found that false allegations „were being made in order to extort money from 
United Nations personnel‟.109 
 
This issue has been contentious, with suggestions that the UN has been too willing to identify 
allegations as false, to classify them as unsubstantiated or to downgrade them to less serious 
offences. For example, Refugees International identified a case of rape wrongly classified as 
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„only‟ prostitution. It also argued that when allegations of rape were made, victims were not 
taken seriously.
110
 The explanation from the UN in its annual reports is that „allegations 
found to be unsubstantiated through an investigation were not necessarily false or made mala 
fides. Allegations were often found to be unsubstantiated because of factors such as a lack of 
conclusive evidence, a lack of witnesses or the impossibility of positively identifying alleged 
perpetrators.‟ 111  Unsubstantiated allegations may therefore be the result of inconclusive 
investigations rather than false allegations. Whilst the controversy surrounding this is 
understandable, a reluctance to openly discuss this issue and try to comprehend it leaves a 
significant gap in our understanding of sexual exploitation and abuse, and calls into question 
whether the UN‟s data is displaying false positives. This is particularly so given that there is 
evidence that some victims have been paid by peacekeepers to keep their silence.
112
 That, of 
course, is likely to fuel false allegations which are then made in the hope obtaining financial 
support.  
 
By contrast, under-reporting of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse is also an issue. A 
Save the Children Report from 2008 found that under-reporting of sexual exploitation and 
abuse against children was widespread, despite the „zero tolerance‟ policy. 113  The report 
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attributed this to fear about the economic impact of reporting and fear of the reaction to an 
allegation. Many child victims also felt an „acceptance of, or resignation to, abuse‟, they had 
a „lack of faith in the response‟, and/or a lack of knowledge about reporting mechanisms.114 
The early annual reports by the UN Secretariat acknowledged the issue of under-reporting. In 
2004 and 2005, the Secretary-General explained that „the data may still not reflect the true 
extent of these deplorable incidents‟ because of under-reporting. 115 In 2008 and 2009, the 
Secretariat accepted that „reports from other organizations suggest chronic‟ 116  and 
„persistent‟117 under-reporting of allegations. Yet, since then, the annual reports have been 
virtually silent on the issue, despite the Security Council recently acknowledging that under-
reporting remains a problem.
118
  
 
This seems surprising given that there is some evidence from other sources that the UN data 
may in fact represent only a small proportion of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse. 
Empirical studies into the issue have been rare – not least because of the complexity of trying 
to collect data from potentially vulnerable victims in hostile environments.
119
 Those studies 
that do exist also often pre-date the UN‟s annual reporting and the steps it has taken to 
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address sexual exploitation and abuse. Nonetheless, one survey from the 1990s reported that 
45 per cent of Dutch navy and marines personnel deployed in the UN‟s Cambodia mission 
„had sexual contact with sex workers or other members of the local population during a five 
month tour‟ of duty.120 Another estimated that there were 24,500 „peacekeeper babies‟ in 
Cambodia by the end of the mission,
121
 whilst in Liberia, a report for UNIFEM stated that 
6,600 babies were registered as having been fathered by peacekeepers during an eight-year 
period.
122
 Other studies suggested that in six out of 12 States with peacekeeping operations 
under examination, „the arrival of peacekeeping troops has been associated with a rapid rise 
in child prostitution.‟123 Under the Secretary-General‟s Bulletin, which has only been in force 
since 2003 and therefore predates some of these findings, sexual contact with the local 
population is not prohibited per se, and therefore not necessarily counted as sexual 
exploitation and abuse since „[s]exual relationships between United Nations staff and 
beneficiaries of assistance‟ are merely „strongly discouraged‟. However, transactional sex or 
sexual contact with those under 18 (and to whom the accused is not married) is always 
prohibited.
124
  
 
In 2013, a panel was appointed by the Secretary-General to review the missions with the 
worst records on sexual exploitation and abuse. It found that „[t]he UN does not know how 
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serious the problem of SEA [sexual exploitation and abuse] is because the official numbers 
mask what appears to be significant amounts of underreporting‟.125 UN staff in the field seem 
to be aware of this. When interviewed by the panel, many reported their suspicions that „the 
numbers and their decline … do not accurately reflect the current situation‟.126 In 2015, the 
Office of Internal Oversight Services tried to assess what it called „significant underreporting‟ 
of transactional sex by looking at „condom distribution and the extent of voluntary 
counselling and confidential testing (VCCT)‟ for HIV infection.127 Although it cautioned that 
this „evidence is not conclusive,‟ its data showed that VCCT rates ranged from zero in one 
mission, to 37,310 over a six year period in another.
128
 The recent Deschamps Review also 
found that it was likely that sexual exploitation and abuse was „vastly under-reported.‟129 The 
Office of Internal Oversight Services has cited an independent survey of a random sample of 
475 women living in Monrovia, Liberia, in 2012. When the results of the survey were 
extrapolated to the Monrovian population at large, the researchers reported that their „best 
estimate‟ was „that about 58,000 women ages 18-30 in 2012 had engaged in transactional sex 
with U.N. personnel at some point‟.130 This is not to suggest that these studies have produced 
the „correct‟ answer to the question of how widespread sexual exploitation and abuse by UN 
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peacekeepers is. No doubt these findings could also be critiqued for their weaknesses, many 
pre-date the UN‟s reforms and there are obvious questions about the extent to which results 
for one mission or one group of victims would carry across to others. Rather, it is to suggest 
that the level of confidence which the UN has in its own data must be misplaced. If anything 
like 58,000 women in Monrovia have had transactional sex with UN personnel in the period 
up to 2012, then it seems unlikely that the accurate number of cases of sexual exploitation 
and abuse involving peacekeeping personnel globally during the period 2003-2012 was the 
1,367 that appear in the UN‟s official reports. 
 
Related to this issue of uncertainty absorption is another problem which calls into question 
the reliability of this data collected by missions in the field and interpreted by UN 
headquarters. As Espeland and Stevens explain, „[o]ne virtue of numbers is that they easily 
circulate and seem straightforward to interpret, making it possible to monitor or govern “at a 
distance”‟.131 In consequence, „[q]uantification permits remote parties to check on people and 
things they wish to control.‟ 132  The collection of data seeks to extend the hand of the 
Secretariat into peacekeeping missions operating in the field in countries all over the world. It 
is an attempt to exercise power remotely. Yet, despite the will of those in New York, „[l]ocal 
centers may understand the process differently, carry out the measurement tasks in different 
ways, or resist cooperating with national and international expectations.‟ 133  A good 
illustration of this is found in the Secretary-General‟s report of 2010. When UN entities were 
asked for their data, „there was some confusion between sexual harassment and sexual 
exploitation and abuse‟, said the Secretary-General, „which is an indication that further 
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education and awareness-raising needs to be done‟.134  The attempt by the Secretariat to 
control matters „at a distance‟ is thus diffused by the missions‟ understanding of the data they 
are supposed to collect. 
 
Additional problems with the UN‟s methods of data collection cast doubt on its ability to 
manage remotely. In 2006, the Secretariat first acknowledged that there exists a discrepancy 
between the numbers of investigations recorded by the Office of Internal Oversight Services 
and those recorded by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, on account of their 
separate databases.
135
 The following year, it was suggested that the root of the difficulty lay 
in the fact that some allegations were reported to the Office of Internal Oversight Services 
and some to the mission in the field as well. „The confidentiality requirements that bind OIOS 
[the Office of Internal Oversight Services] pose challenges for the comparison and 
harmonization of data received by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations through its 
missions.‟136 In short, confidentiality prevents the two UN entities from sharing information 
that each holds. Attempts were made to remedy this through the development of „an Internet-
based Misconduct Tracking System‟,137 although in 2009 the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services did not have access to it.
138
 That having been resolved, the attempt to centralise the 
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collection of allegations via focal points and conduct and discipline teams has not been 
successful because allegations are still made to a variety of different entities.
139
 In 2013, the 
panel appointed by the Secretary-General found that „[o]ne reason official SEA [sexual 
exploitation and abuse] allegation numbers do not match the actual numbers of instances of 
SEA is that all cases which make their way to the attention of UN officials do not get collated 
in the Misconduct Tracking System‟ since „[t]he number of routes by which cases make their 
way through the UN is large‟.140 „Reports by CDT [Conduct and Discipline Teams] to senior 
management are not therefore comprehensive‟ yet „it is widely believed in mission that CDT 
numbers include all reports to the UN.‟141 This is another demonstration of the misplaced 
confidence in the UN‟s data. 
 
 
Wider implications for legal reform 
 
Whilst these problems with the UN‟s data make it unlikely that it can be relied upon as an 
accurate indicator of the scale of sexual exploitation and abuse, there are wider implications 
here too. The creation and dissemination of these statistics has become an exercise of global 
governance by the UN. As Löwenheim explains, „[f]rom a Foucauldian point of view all 
knowledge is political‟142 since the production of knowledge allows the governors to know 
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those that they seek to govern.
143
 Indeed, for Foucault, „statistics is knowledge of the state, of 
the forces and resources that characterize a state at a given moment.‟144 These practices of 
collating and disseminating statistics, therefore, „are important not only because they make 
possible a knowledge of the subject but also because they thereby make objects visible, 
shaping them into forms that are calculable and able to be regulated‟.145  
 
For the UN, its statistics on sexual exploitation and abuse are indisputably, undoubtedly, and 
undeniably political. They are a mechanism through which power can be exercised.
146
 The 
contention by the UN that allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse are falling and, ergo, 
this demonstrates the success of the „zero tolerance‟ policy is a clear attempt to wrestle back 
authority after the chaotic scandal which engulfed the organisation in 2003. To this end, the 
effect of labelling
147
 the statistics is important: this sends the message that there is a 
phenomenon called „sexual exploitation and abuse‟ and that it has been counted. This makes 
sexual exploitation and abuse visible, but only on the UN‟s terms. That which is not deemed 
sexual exploitation and abuse is not counted. For example, in two reports to the General 
Assembly, the Secretary General explains that UN personnel sending pornography via email 
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is not sexual exploitation and abuse when it does not involve beneficiaries of assistance. 
Despite, therefore, still being misconduct, it is not included in the annually reported 
statistics.
148
 „The mere act of measuring something confers value to it‟149  and hence not 
measuring something may be a statement of its lack of value. Arguably, this implies that the 
non-sexual exploitation and abuse is not worth counting as it does not have sufficient 
importance to make the collection of data about it worthwhile. One may reflect not only on 
the sending of pornography by email, but also on other forms of misconduct by peacekeepers 
– homicide, non-sexual violence, corruption and so forth. The General Assembly has not 
mandated the Secretary-General to report annually in this way on these forms of misconduct, 
despite the harm that these behaviours inflict on the local population in peacekeeping host 
States and the impact that they have on the mission and the UN as a whole.
150
 Why is sexual 
exploitation and abuse more important than other forms of peacekeeper misconduct? 
 
In making sexual exploitation and abuse visible, it is also simplified. Any form of 
quantification necessarily involves simplification of a multifaceted social phenomenon. The 
statistics purport to represent sexual exploitation and abuse in „black and white‟,151 making „a 
complex social reality easier to comprehend and analyse‟.152 As we have seen, the UN has 
                                                          
148
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taken its „flawed and incomplete data … and merge[d] them together to produce an 
apparently coherent and complete picture.‟ 153  The statistics, and the Secretary-General‟s 
reports, claim to show the nature and extent of peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse. 
Nevertheless, it is of course not a simple phenomenon. It has complex social, historical, legal 
and economic features which we consider next, and which contribute to the issue and present 
challenges to addressing it.
154
 Reducing it to numerical values belies this complexity and 
context.
155
  
 
Another obvious manifestation of this exercise of global governance is the creation of 
bureaucracy.
156
 The UN has established the Conduct and Discipline Unit in New York and 
focal points and conduct and discipline teams within missions which are responsible for 
collecting and assimilating the data so that it can be reported to the General Assembly. This 
has obvious economic implications. When the Secretariat was requested to quantify the 
annual cost of the UN‟s work on sexual exploitation and abuse, it explained that an estimate 
was „only partially possible‟ because UN systems for dealing with misconduct are not limited 
to sexual exploitation and abuse. Nonetheless, the Secretary General calculated the costs of 
the conduct and discipline teams and the central Conduct and Discipline Unit for 2012/13 to 
be over US$9million.
157
 The decision to collect this data therefore influences decisions made 
about the allocation of resources to tackle the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse.
158
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Furthermore, the extent to which the data shows it to be a continuing problem (or not) may 
have similar implications for future budgets. 
 
By creating this bureaucracy to collate and disseminate statistics on sexual exploitation and 
abuse, the UN has shown a tendency to „consolidate power in the hands of those with expert 
knowledge.‟159 The annual reports present and establish the UN as „“technical” experts‟ on 
the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse, „produc[ing] knowledge‟ about this phenomenon 
„to define or shape the way‟ in which it is „understood‟.160 The danger with this is that „[b]y 
providing a particular specialized lens to investigate a problem, experts will come up with 
solutions that ﬁt the range of their spectacles, and create their own blind spots along the 
way.‟ 161  The failure to adequately acknowledge the limitations of the data may be a 
demonstration of such a blind spot. This privileging of technical expert knowledge also 
comes at the expense of local knowledge.
162
 Indeed as Merry highlights, indicator projects 
tend to be „created in the global North – which sets the agenda, names the indicator, and 
assembles the criteria – while data collection typically takes place mostly in the global 
South.‟163 This is equally true of UN statistics on sexual exploitation and abuse.  
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Perhaps the best illustration of this privileging of expert knowledge is the problem of under-
reporting. The UN, when it acknowledges this issue, often views the root of the difficulty as 
practical: lack of knowledge of or access to reporting mechanisms by those who need 
them.
164
 Yet, since the UN itself created the definition of sexual exploitation and abuse via 
the Secretary-General‟s Bulletin, whether victims and witnesses will report allegations 
depends in large part on their understanding of this „expert‟ definition, their ability to identify 
that their experience merits reporting and their willingness to do so. In a different but related 
context, research from the 1990s into domestic violence in the UK found that the majority of 
victims would not define as criminal the violence to which they had been subject
165
 and 
therefore would not consider reporting it to the police. A similar difficulty might well exist in 
relation to reporting sexual exploitation and abuse to the UN. In societies which may harbour 
strong patriarchal attitudes, coupled with a history that might include extensive conflict-
related sexual violence, and a lack of either existing or enforceable domestic laws addressing 
gender-based crimes, it will always be challenging to rely on victims to self-identify as 
victims.
166
 This is particularly so because of the wide variety of locations to which 
peacekeeping missions are deployed, and the wide variety of states which provide personnel 
to such missions. From Cyprus to Sudan, via Lebanon and Haiti, the „zero tolerance‟ policy 
applies as if one size fits all, regardless of different local laws, histories, cultures and gender 
politics. If those local victims and witnesses of sexual exploitation and abuse do not 
understand the remit of the „zero tolerance‟ policy or where they fall within it, or even that 
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such matters can be reported to the UN, it is unsurprising that statistics on allegations will 
suffer from under-reporting. 
  
Additionally, what may be important to some victims is not whether their allegation does or 
does not fall within the official definitions of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, but the 
extent to which they felt their experience was believed when reported, whether they were 
treated with respect and/or whether adequate compensation was forthcoming. Others may be 
resigned to, or indeed eager to continue, their interaction with peacekeepers, even though it 
falls foul of the UN‟s prohibitions. These experiences are not, and perhaps cannot, be 
adequately measured.  
 
This exercise of power through statistics has the further effect of diminishing contestation,
167
 
shrinking the space available for challenging the gendered, colonial, legal, economic and 
political factors which influence the existence of sexual exploitation and abuse and the 
response to it.
168
 If the UN is to be believed, the numbers moving in the „correct‟ direction (ie 
downwards) is proof that the „zero tolerance‟ policy is working and therefore the policy must 
be a positive development. Aside from the fact that a causal relationship between the UN‟s 
policy and the diminishing number of allegations may not be established, this representation 
                                                          
167
 Satterthwaite (n 94 above), 255-256; Davis et al (n 32 above), 19. 
168
 See, eg, Awori et al (n 23 above); J. McGill, „Survival Sex in Peacekeeping Economies: Re-Reading the Zero 
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(2014) 18 Journal of International Peacekeeping 1; M. Kanetake, „The UN Zero Tolerance Policy‟s 
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of the data neglects broader critiques about that policy. Scholars, concerned that the policy 
amounts to a „sex panic‟, have challenged the UN‟s assertion that transactional sex between 
peacekeepers and locals is inherently exploitative.
169
 Undoubtedly there are some cases 
which are exceptionally exploitative. But, some have argued that it is an oversimplification to 
suggest that this is true of all transactional sexual relationships. Empirical research involving 
interviews with some of those who have provided sex to peacekeepers demonstrates the point. 
What emerges is a broad range of motivations. At one extreme are cases of „survival 
prostitution‟ involving those who sell sex for food and shelter.170 Yet, at the other end of the 
spectrum are those looking for a „sugar daddy‟, that is to say a „mutually beneficial‟ 
relationship with a peacekeeper which would allow the local party to „improve their standard 
of living.‟171  
 
This complexity amongst cases of prostitution – and the varying degrees to which the 
supplying party is able to act with agency – is lost in the UN‟s blanket prohibition.172 The 
legal structures established by the Secretary-General and the member states for addressing 
sexual exploitation and abuse do not seem capable of reflecting this level of nuance. There is 
virtually no debate at the UN about the appropriateness of prohibiting all the behaviours 
                                                          
169
 D. Otto, „Making sense of zero tolerance policies in peacekeeping sexual economies‟ in V. Munro and C.F. 
Stychin (eds), Sexuality and the Law: Feminist Engagements (London: Routledge, 2007); K.M. Jennings, 
„Service, sex, and security: Gendered peacekeeping economies in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo‟ (2014) 45(4) Security Dialogue 313; Simić (n 86 above); O. Simić, „Rethinking „sexual exploitation‟ in 
UN peacekeeping operations‟ (2009) 32 Women’s Studies International Forum 288. 
170
 Higate (n 86 above), 23; K.M. Jennings, „Unintended Consequences of Intimacy: Political Economies of 
Peacekeeping and Sex Tourism‟ (2010) 17(2) International Peacekeeping 229, 233. 
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caught by the „zero tolerance‟ policy. The UN‟s response to this phenomenon has also 
focused considerably less attention on the economic factors which contribute to sexual 
exploitation and abuse, including the sharp discrepancy between the incomes of locals and 
peacekeepers. This creates a two-tier economy in the host State, arguably fuelling the need 
for some locals to engage in transactional sex.
173
 The lack of employment opportunities for 
women in the aftermath of conflict, driving some into prostitution, has not been addressed.
174
 
Instead, by presenting the statistics as proof of the success of the „zero tolerance‟ policy, the 
„embedded… “ideology”‟ of the statistics175 is revealed: that sexual exploitation and abuse is 
all bad, and that the UN‟s strategy is the „solution‟ to this „problem‟.  
 
This serves to limit criticism of UN policy. The media takes the statistics at face value, whilst 
academics have been remarkably uncritical of the UN‟s annual reports.176 Despite the volume 
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A Journal of Social Justice 369, 370; Z. Deen-Racsmány, „The Amended UN Model Memorandum of 
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Sexual Abuse and Exploitation, and Effective Control of Blue Helmets‟ (2012) 16 Journal of International 
Peacekeeping 1, 2; M. O‟Brien, „Protectors on trial? Prosecuting peacekeepers for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in the International Criminal Court‟ (2012) 40(3) International Journal of Law, Crime and 
Justice 223, 224; The Guardian, Ban Ki-moon says sexual abuse in UN peacekeeping is ‘a cancer in our system’, 
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of literature produced by the academy over the last decade on the UN response to sexual 
exploitation and abuse, very little research attempts to undertake an analysis of these 
statistics.
177
 Even the panel appointed by the Secretary-General, despite its criticisms of the 
issues of under-reporting and data management, accepts the official version of events, 
commenting that „it is true that the number of SEA [sexual exploitation and abuse] cases is 
decreasing‟ in the missions it was mandated to examine.178 The raw data is, of course, not 
publicly released, and the effort of reading and analysing the statistics is such that few have 
the time, money or patience to sustain it. Even fewer institutions have statistics to compete 
with the UN‟s own, and compiling alternative data is complex, expensive and perhaps 
impossible, particularly given the environments to which peacekeeping operations are 
deployed.
179
 Since the UN‟s data cannot realistically be subject to external audit, the UN 
cannot be held accountable.  
 
Most significantly, because the data is used by the UN to paint the perpetrators of sexual 
exploitation and abuse as a few „bad apples‟, it is no longer necessary to scrutinize the 
structural features of this issue or of UN policy, and particularly the role that law plays. The 
impetus to improve the legal arrangements which establish accountability for the worst cases 
of sexual exploitation and abuse seems to have lost the momentum which existed in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
peacekeeping-is-a-cancer-in-our-system; The Guardian, UN received 99 sexual abuse complaints against its 
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177
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aftermath of the Zeid report in 2005. In respect of officials and experts on mission, 
prosecution by their State of nationality may not be possible if the State lacks extra-territorial 
jurisdiction. Prosecution in the mission host State may also not be feasible where the State 
lacks resources, legal infrastructure or fails to comply with international fair trial standards. 
To remedy this, the Draft Convention on the Criminal Accountability of United Nations 
Officials and Experts on Mission was recommended by Prince Zeid.
180
 It has yet to 
materialize. More than ten years on, it remains stuck in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the 
General Assembly
181
 and it is unclear whether agreement is likely to be reached as to its 
contents, or whether sufficient numbers of member states will become signatories to it. The 
result is that, for some of those committing even the worst acts of sexual exploitation and 
abuse, the most serious consequences they may encounter is dismissal from employment by 
the UN.  
 
In respect of military contingents who are unlikely to be covered by the Draft Convention, 
there is still a flaw in the existing legal arrangements, namely the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
troop-contributor to investigate and prosecute cases by its personnel.
182
 Whilst the Secretary-
General‟s annual reports said little, until recently, about the extent to which troop-
contributors prosecuted their military contingents for sexual exploitation and abuse, the 
                                                          
180
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suspicion has remained that few perpetrators are subject to disciplinary or criminal 
prcoeedings by their home State.
183
 In his most recent annual report, the Secretary-General 
proposed that peacekeeping host states be provided with a subsidiary jurisdiction, allowing 
them to prosecute in cases where the troop-contributor is unwilling,
184
 although whether that 
will garner political support from the member states remains to be seen. In light of the delays 
affecting the Draft Convention, it might be unlikely. Moreover, it does not address the 
difficulty of host states that are logistically unable to try such cases or would not provide a 
fair trial. 
 
In the meantime, the Security Council has endorsed the Secretary-General‟s new position that 
entire military or police units should be repatriated where that is „credible evidence‟ that 
sexual exploitation and abuse is „widespread or systemic‟, and that such units may be 
replaced where the troop or police contributor fails to investigate or prosecute cases.
185
 Yet, 
these proposals notwithstanding, the counter-narrative from the UN‟s annual reports that the 
„zero-tolerance‟ policy is proving successful distracts public attention and deflects criticism 
from the limitations of the law.
186
 The need for legal reform to tackle this „accountability 
                                                          
183
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deficit‟187 has reduced urgency when the number of allegations appears in the data to be 
diminishing. After all, if sexual exploitation and abuse is only a „small problem‟ which seems 
to be going away, then there is less incentive to expend political will attempting to develop 
new policies and legal avenues for accountability. In particular, the Secretariat‟s claims about 
the success of „zero tolerance‟ leaves the member states absolved of the responsibility for 
undertaking these reforms. 
 
This latter consequence is exacerbated because the UN‟s reporting, until recently, 
deliberately omitted statistics on the nationality of those accused of sexual exploitation and 
abuse, allowing police- and troop-contributors to remain anonymous. It is interesting here to 
note Foucault‟s argument that historically statistics „were considered as secrets of power not 
to be divulged‟.188 Until 2016, the identity of troop and police-contributors whose personnel 
commit sexual exploitation and abuse was the UN‟s secret. Although never stated explicitly, 
it is assumed that the unwillingness to name these states stemmed from the political muscle 
wielded by contributors in providing peacekeepers to UN missions in a context of 
shortages.
189
 This stands in contrast to the recommendation of the Zeid Report that 
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contributors who fail to address sexual exploitation and abuse should be so-called named and 
shamed.
190
  
 
In 2013, the Secretary-General committed to producing „country-specific data‟ for his report 
in 2015
191
 but such commitment seems to have wavered in the face of political opposition. 
Instead, in the 2015 report, it was explained that, „[w]ith a view to doing so in future reports, 
the Secretary-General expects to further discuss this matter with Member States.‟192 The 
policy of „name and shame‟ was, however, resurrected after the recent allegations involving 
peacekeepers in the Central African Republic made headlines again.
193
 Meanwhile, the Office 
of Internal Oversight Services controversially added its voice to the call for „naming and 
shaming‟. It released publicly, for the first time, Department of Field Support „data from 
2010 to 2013 showing substantiated SEA allegations against‟ named member states. Sixty-
four substantiated allegations were recorded against 31 identified troop-contributors.
194
 Yet, 
this data does not appear to match that from the Secretary-General‟s annual reports. From the 
disjointed information provided to the General Assembly for the same period, it seems 
possible to uncover only 42 substantiated allegations involving military contingent 
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personnel.
195
 Finally, in the 2016 annual report, the Secretary-General for the first time 
documented the nationality of military and police personnel subject to allegations (although 
not civilian staff),
196
 and committed to do so for future years, including for allegations 
„reported prior to 2015‟. 197  The question which follows is what the consequences for 
recalcitrant States will be, and whether they should be blacklisted from making future 
contributions. The Secretary-General recently recommended that states identified in his 
conflict-related sexual violence reports should not be permitted to provide troops or police to 
peacekeeping missions
198
 but has not gone quite as far in the annual reports on sexual 
exploitation and abuse.  Instead, the Security Council has requested the „Secretary-General to 
assess whether a Member State has taken the appropriate steps to investigate, hold 
accountable and inform him of the progress of its investigations when determining whether 
that Member State should participate in other current or future United Nations peacekeeping 
operations‟.199 With increasing numbers of peacekeepers deployed to increasingly complex 
environments, the UN Secretariat will now have to decide whether to bite the hand that feeds 
them. 
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Conclusion 
 
Statistics are often deployed as impartial, accurate and authentic reflections of social reality. 
As Ward, explains, „[t]o many an untrained eye, figures convey a form of truth that is 
uncontestable and incontrovertible. People regard data as facts and assume that statistics 
represent reality. They view statistics as a neutral, sanitized, and objective expression of an 
unseen truth‟.200 Statistics are therefore taken to be the numerical expression of an identified 
social phenomenon. In quantifying and classifying data, authors „generate an appearance of 
scientiﬁc objectivity and methodological rigour‟201 in which the data appears reliable and 
apolitical.
202
 This neutral and objective appearance is one of the explanations for the 
„burgeoning production and use of indicators in global governance‟ across a vast swathe of 
areas.
203
 As we have seen, the unreliability of the UN‟s data calls into question the extent to 
which inferences from it can be substantiated. However, whilst the UN‟s data is flawed, this 
is not, ultimately, a call for the production of „better‟ data. Regardless of their quality, these 
statistics about sexual exploitation and abuse cannot be apolitical. The process of collating 
and disseminating these statistics necessarily requires the concept being studied to be labelled, 
simplified and ambiguity absorbed. The collection and presentation of the statistics therefore 
results in increased influence for those with „expert‟ knowledge about how to do this, ensures 
that the space for contestation is diminished, and undermines the pressure for legal reform.  
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As we have seen, the manipulation of data in this manner is a „technology‟ of global 
governance with implications for the exercise of power in international relations. The UN 
Secretariat‟s political authority, its relationship with member states, the impetus for new legal 
arrangements and the allocation of economic resources are all affected by these statistics. 
Increasingly, academic attention is being paid to efforts to enhance the accountability of 
global governance, whether by legal mechanisms or other means.
204
 An aspect of this is 
growing „questions regarding accountability and legitimacy‟205 of indicators and those that 
produce them, combined with calls for their regulation. To this end, the UN‟s statistics on 
sexual exploitation and abuse are a useful warning about the risks of seeking to improve 
accountability by „pray[ing] to false gods that offer quantitative certainty‟.206  The initial 
reason for UN data collection on sexual exploitation and abuse was part of an attempt to 
increase the accountability of the organisation by monitoring the extent to which its personnel 
engaged in (what it deemed) exploitative and abusive behaviour with locals in peacekeeping 
host States. The consequence was that the UN Secretariat became responsible for measuring 
its own internal phenomenon, collecting data about itself and producing statistics on the 
conduct of its own personnel, whether directly employed or acting under its command. This 
is unusual because indicators established by international organisations, States or non-
governmental organisations more commonly measure behaviour by, or features of, other 
States or private individuals. Research on indicators as an exercise in global governance has, 
in general, focused on the indicators which purport to measure phenomenon external to the 
                                                          
204
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entity undertaking the measurement. But the landscape is more complex than this. Whilst the 
Secretary-General‟s annual reports have external effects (for example, in seeking to promote 
the UN‟s authority to member states, communities in peacekeeping host States, the media and 
the public at large), they are also an attempt at self-regulation. The UN is here charged with 
collecting the data and setting the standards in respect of a phenomenon created by the 
conduct of its own personnel. The obvious conflict of interest here, arguably leading the UN 
to project false confidence in the data, seems to have passed by largely unnoticed.  
 
As this article has shown, as an attempt to ensure accountability, the statistics have suffered 
the same weaknesses found in other indictors which simplify a complex social phenomenon, 
losing ambiguity and nuance. Worse, criticism of the UN‟s „zero tolerance‟ policy is muted in 
the face of statistics which are presented to demonstrate that the „problem‟ is decreasing and 
therefore the policy is „working‟ – a policy the Deschamps Review described as having „had 
little effect‟.207 Similarly, the role of law in addressing sexual exploitation and abuse – and 
the responsibility of member states in this regard – appears diminished. The need for legal 
reform seems less pressing in light of statistics which purport to show limited numbers of 
allegations which are now falling year-on-year. This is particularly ironic given that the initial 
request by the General Assembly that the data be collected arose out of concerns that 
perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse could behave with impunity. In this case, the 
search for more accountability may have resulted in less.  
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